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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of combining an international cap-and-trade 
scheme with national carbon taxes. We consider a two-country stochastic partial equilibrium 
model with log-normally distributed uncertainty. The situation is analogous to the situation 
where European countries impose national carbon taxes in addition to the EU emissions 
trading. The allowance price in the joint cap-and-trade scheme depends on the tax rate, the 
relative size of countries and abatement options, the magnitude of uncertainty, and correlation 
of abatement costs. In most cases, the additional tax will not lead to additional production of 
the public good beyond the fixed targets. The additional tax results in higher costs of 
abatement to the country introducing the additional tax, and higher costs overall.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper examines linkages of price and quantity instruments for reductions in emissions. 
Regulation by prices is introduced as an additional tax on top of regulation by quantities. The 
model builds on a more general analysis of price-quantity linking for public good provision in 
Wood et al. (2013). 
We assume that two countries are covered by a joint cap-and-trade scheme and aim to 
comply with their respective targets for emissions levels, which are below expected business-
as-usual emissions. In addition to the cap-and-trade scheme a tax is levied in country 1, on top 
of the cap-and-trade price. Allowances (or permits) are fully tradable, so compliance with the 
emissions targets occurs in aggregate: if one country reduces its emissions below the target, 
the other country can stay above its target, and the difference is accounted for by permits 
traded between the two countries. We take uncertainty in the cost of public good production 
into account by applying log-normally distributed error terms to the countries’ cost functions. 
Situations as modeled in this paper occur in practice. A prominent example is the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. The EU ETS is a joint cap-and-trade scheme of 27 EU member 
states, Norway, and Liechtenstein. Exogenous abatement targets are implicitly given by the 
countries’ commitments to reduce emissions—for example, by the EU burden-sharing 
agreement (EU, 2002). In addition to the joint trading scheme, some countries introduced 
additional policies. Examples are the UK “price floor,” which works as an additional charge 
on emissions for the UK power sector, to bring the effective carbon price to a predetermined 
minimum level (Toke, 2011); carbon taxes that have existed in several European countries in 
parallel to the EU ETS (OECD, 2013); as well as the many non-pricing policies that exist in 
different countries, such as the German renewable feed-in tariff system (IEA, 2013). We 
model the partial equilibrium effect of such policies on prices, costs, and abatement in a joint 
trading scheme. 
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The existence of a “single price” on some externality is a condition for efficiency in 
many situations. If firms minimize costs, and if there are no market distortions, marginal costs 
will be equated among all sources of emissions given the single price, which is a least-cost 
solution (Baumol and Oates, 1988, 1971; Baumol, 1972; Montgomery, 1972). Thus it is to be 
expected that the overall cost of reducing emissions is higher if the marginal cost of 
abatement effort differs between countries. This has been shown in general equilibrium 
modeling exercises such as those conducted by Böhringer at al. (2009a), who suggested that 
the overlapping instruments and multiple targets of the EU approach will lead to excess cost 
against a first best situation; by Böhringer et al. (2009b), who showed that additional policies 
(i.e., multiple carbon prices) will likely increase the overall cost of greenhouse-gas mitigation 
in the EU considerably; and Boeters and Koornneef (2011), who examined the likely cost of 
the EU renewable energy target, which is a separate element of the EU 2020 climate strategy, 
in parallel to the emissions-reduction target. 
It is important to note that the single price that would result from an emissions trading 
scheme need not necessarily equal the “Pigouvian” price that equates the marginal cost of 
abatement with its marginal benefit. In practice the social costs of an externality such as 
greenhouse-gas emissions are difficult to assess (Baumol, 1972). It may be that additional 
policies beyond the EU ETS, such as the UK carbon price floor or the German renewable 
feed-in tariff scheme, reflect different views about acceptable or appropriate levels of 
externalities or costs of emissions abatement. In this paper, we set aside questions of the 
(social) optimality of emissions abatement targets, and instead focus on the distribution of 
costs of achieving some policy target. Our model is stochastic, allowing assessment of the 
probability distribution of different outcomes for costs, and thus an assessment of cost risks 
alongside expected values. Our modeling omits general equilibrium effects which can be of 
importance for assessments of actual (social) cost under different revenue recycling regimes 
or given pre-existing taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 
3 
 
1994; Bovenberg, 1999). Different revenue recycling regimes can also have major 
implications for first-best instrument choice (Pezzey and Jotzo, 2012). 
We show that an additional tax levied in one country will increase the country’s cost 
of producing the public good, decrease the others country’s cost, and increase overall costs. 
This is because of differences in marginal abatement costs. The allowance price in the joint 
cap-and-trade scheme will decrease as result of the tax relative to a situation without the extra 
tax. The relative size of countries and the magnitude and correlation of uncertainty are 
important determinants for the actual effect of the tax on the allowance price and total costs. 
Additional abatement generated by the tax will only occur in cases when all abatement is 
generated by the tax and exceeds the joint quantity target of public good production of both 
countries. This represents a corner solution in which the cap-and-trade allowance price equals 
zero. Expected costs can be far higher in this situation than in the case of pure cap-and-trade 
without the tax. 
2 The model 
The model considers two countries (or, alternatively, regions, sectors, or firms) which are 
jointly covered under quantity regulation by cap-and-trade. Each country has an emissions 
target, and needs to reduce its emissions below some business-as-usual level. This can be 
described as each country having been allocated the production of a quantity of a public good 
(e.g., emissions reductions), denoted by ܳ௜. The production of the good incurs costs, which 
are ex-ante uncertain. Country 1 or country 2 produces abatement ݍ௜ ൒ 0 at costs ܿ௜, so that 
ܿ௜ ൌ ܿ௜ሺݍ௜, ௜ሻ,	
where the random variable ௜ influences the costs for country ݅.1 
                                                          
1 Modeling uncertainty under price and quantity-based emissions control as a random change in the slope of the 
marginal abatement cost curve is in the tradition of Weitzman (1974) and the subsequent literature, and we 
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Cost functions are continuous and twice differentiable. Partial derivatives of country 
݅’s cost function with respect to ݍ satisfy 
ܿ௤ᇱ ൐ 0 
and 
ܿ௤ᇱᇱ ൐ 0. 
Pure cap-and-trade 
When both countries produce the amount of ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ under a joint cap-and-trade scheme, and 
assuming that there are no distortions in the market, marginal costs will be equated.2 
Allowances issued under cap-and-trade are fully tradable and it is assumed that there is full 
compliance with the quantity targets. The joint amount of the produced good equals the 
required quantity, so that ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ ൌ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ	. If a is the amount of allowances sold from 
country 1 to country 2 (a can be positive or negative), the equilibrium market price for 
allowances ݌∗ satisfies 
݌∗ ൌ ܿଵᇱሺݍଵ ൅ ܽ, ߠଵሻ ൌ ܿଶᇱ ሺݍଶ െ ܽ, ߠଶሻ.     (1) 
Equation 1 characterizes the cost-minimizing allocation of abatement between the 
countries under cap-and-trade (in the absence of transaction costs, market power and pre-
existing distortions). The allowance price equals the marginal valuation of allowances by the 
countries. The amount of traded allowances is chosen so that abatement costs are minimized 
in each of the countries. A country will sell allowances as long as marginal revenues from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
follow this convention. It would also be possible to model uncertainty about underlying emissions growth and 
thus the amount of effort required to meet any chosen emissions target, but this would complicate the analysis 
without providing additional insights. 
2 Transaction costs (Stavins, 1995), market power (Hahn, 1984; Sinn and Schmoltzi, 1981), and non-cost-
minimizing behavior (Hahn and Stavins, 2011) are distortions under which marginal abatement costs might not 
be equated and a least-cost solution might not be achieved. 
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selling allowances are larger than marginal costs of domestic public good production. A 
country will purchase allowances as long as allowances are sold on the market at cost below 
the marginal cost of producing the public good domestically. Thus, for a given vector of 
public good production ሺܳଵ ൅ ܳଶሻ, there is a cost-minimizing price ݌∗ (Baumol and Oates, 
1971). With a “market in emission licenses,” the market will reach the cost-minimizing 
equilibrium (Montgomery, 1972). 
In Figure 1, the equilibrium allowance price under cap-and-trade is given at point A 
where marginal costs of both countries are equated. Countries produce quantities ݍଵ,ଶ∗  at price 
݌∗. In this case, no trading of allowances occurs. 
 
Figure 1: Marginal cost functions ܿ௜ᇱሺݍ௜, ߠ௜ሻ and produced quantities of both countries ݍ௜ (x-
axis) with and without the tax introduced by Country 1.  
 
Because marginal costs are equated between the countries, there are no options to 
further decrease the costs of producing the public good. If both countries choose the cost-
minimizing quantities of the public good production ݍ௜∗ so that it satisfies equation 1 and 
subject to the quantity constraint ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ ൌ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ	 costs for each country are 
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ܥଵሺߠଵ, ߠଶሻ ൌ ܿଵሺݍଵ∗, ߠଵሻ െ ݌∗ܽ      (2) 
and 
ܥଶሺߠଵ, ߠଶሻ ൌ ܿଶሺݍଶ∗, ߠଶሻ ൅ ݌∗ܽ.      (3) 
The case of “pure” cap-and-trade as described in this section will serve as reference 
case in the model in the case of cap-and-trade with an additional tax in country 1. Since a 
fully competitive cap-and-trade scheme with zero transaction costs is assumed as reference 
case, it is important to note that results could change considerably if these assumptions are 
relaxed. Market power of one of the parties engaged in trading will (in most cases) lead to a 
different allocation and distribution of cost than in the competitive case (Hahn, 1984; Sinn 
and Schmoltzi, 1981). Transaction cost, e.g., for allowance trading, will change the 
equilibrium allocation under cap-and-trade (Stavins, 1995). 
Additional unilateral tax by one country under cap-and-trade 
We now turn to the case where country 1 implements a policy to produce a larger amount of 
the public good domestically relative to the existing cap-and-trade scheme. To do so, an 
additional unit-tax ݐଵ ൐ 0 on top of the allowance price under cap-and-trade is levied in 
country 1.3 The tax results in production of the same tradable good, namely emissions 
reductions in country 1, whether country 1 initially was a net exporter or a net importer of the 
good under the cap-and-trade regime. The price under cap-and-trade and the additional tax 
must satisfy 
 
                                                          
3 This is the key difference between the model we use here and the one used in Wood et al. (2013), where it is 
assumed that country 1 only levies a tax and the price from the cap-and-trade scheme applied only in country 2. 
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݌෤ ൌ ܿଵᇱሺݍ෤ଵ ൅ ܽ, ߠଵሻ െ ݐଵ ൌ ܿଶᇱ ሺݍ෤ଶ െ ܽ, ߠଶሻ.     (4) 
The tilde denotes the cap-and-trade price and amounts of the public good provided if there is a 
tax, as distinct from the case without the additional tax above. Again both countries choose 
the optimal amounts of public good ݍ෤௜ so that it satisfies equation 4 and subject to the quantity 
constraint ݍ෤ଵ ൅ ݍ෤ଶ ൌ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ	at tax rate ݐଵ. 
The amount of public good produced by country 1 consists of two parts: one 
attributable to the tax and the other attributable to the permit price under cap-and-trade. If the 
allowance price under cap-and-trade was equal to zero, country 1 would still produce some 
amount of the public good by virtue of the tax. The additional quantity produced by country 1 
in response to the tax is equal to distance CB in Figure 1 (in which the allowance price is 
positive). 
The unilateral introduction of the tax by country 1 changes marginal conditions and, 
other things equal, leads to increased public good production in country 1, so that ݍ෤ଵ ൐ ݍଵ∗. 
Increased production by country 1 lowers the need for production by country 2 given the 
quantity constraint ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ, so that ݍ෤ଶ ൏ ݍଶ∗. As a consequence, the allowance price under 
cap-and-trade decreases. 
If ݍ෤ଵ ൒ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ, there is no need for further public good production (emissions 
reductions) by country 2. This is a corner solution in which all of the good is produced in 
country 1. Country 1 values the public good by its marginal costs ܿଵᇱሺݍ෤ଵ, ߠଵሻ ൌ ݌ ൅ ݐ. It 
follows from (4) that for ݍ෤ଵ ൒ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ, the allowance price is zero and country 2 acquires ܳଶ 
from country 1 to fulfill its target. Costs in the corner solution are 
ܥଵሺߠଵ, ߠଶሻ ൌ ܿଵሺݍ෤ଵ, ߠଵሻ       (5) 
and 
ܥଶሺߠଵ, ߠଶሻ ൌ 0	.        (6) 
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Alternatively, if ݍ෤ଵ ൏ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ, there is need for further abatement in the joint cap-
and-trade scheme. In this case, countries produce the amounts of ݍ෤௜ of the public good which 
satisfies equation 4. From equation 4 it follows that a positive valuation is given to the 
tradable public good either by country 1 (given the tax) or by country 2, so that ݌∗ ൐ ݌෤ ൐ 0. 
Since countries are assumed to comply with their quantity targets ܳଵ, ܳଶ, the number of traded 
permits in the interior solution is ܽ ൌ ܳଶ െ ݍ෤ଶ.4 Costs are 
ܥଵሺߠଵ, ߠଶሻ ൌ ܿଵሺݍ෤ଵ, ߠଶሻ െ ݌෤ܽ      (7) 
and 
ܥଶሺߠଵ, ߠଶሻ ൌ ܿଶሺݍ෤ଶ, ߠଶሻ ൅ ݌෤ܽ.      (8) 
Whenever ݐଵ ൐ 0 with ݌෤ ൏ ݌∗, ݍ෤ଵ ൐ ݍଵ∗, and ݍ෤ଶ ൏ ݍଶ∗  overall cost of public good 
production exceed costs in the case of pure cap-and-trade. This is because 
׬ ܿଵᇱ௤෤భ௤భ∗ െ ׬ ܿଶᇱ
௤మ∗
௤෤మ ൐ 0 .  
(In Figure 1, excess costs are represented by the area BAD.) In other words, the cost increases 
in country 1 cannot be fully offset by cost decreases in country 2. 
Because of the binding quantity constraint ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ, no additional amount of the 
public good (exceeding the amount that would have been produced under pure cap-and-trade) 
will be produced in the interior solution. Additional amounts of the public good will only be 
produced in the corner solution where ݍ෤ଵ ൐ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ. In this case country 1 produces all of the 
public good and the produced quantity can exceed the cap-and-trade quantity constraint 
ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ. 
                                                          
4 Assuming compliance with the quantity targets is equivalent to assuming a “very high” compliance penalty in 
the emissions trading scheme in country 2. 
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Figure 1 illustrates that the introduction of the tax in country 1 shifts public good 
production, so that country 1 produces more of the good vice versa the case of pure cap-and-
trade (ݍଵ,ଶ∗  to ݍ෤ଵ,ଶ∗ ). The introduction of the tax has two effects. Firstly, the effective price and 
the produced quantity in country 1 increase from A to D in Figure 1. Secondly, the effective 
price and the quantity produced in country 2 decrease from A to B. This drives a wedge 
between marginal abatement costs and causes excess costs equal to the area BAD. The two 
effects are not necessarily symmetric as in Figure 1. They depend on abatement cost 
parameters ߙ௜ of the countries relative to each other, targets ܳ௜, and uncertainty inherent in 
abatement cost functions. Below we examine the two effects by taking expectations over log-
normally distributed “shocks” to abatement cost functions. 
Under pure cap-and-trade, the price for allowances (y axis) is ݌∗ and equals marginal 
abatement costs of both countries (A). Countries produce quantities ݍ௜∗. If country 1 
unilaterally levies ݐଵ (distance BD) on top of the allowance price, the allowance price will 
decrease to ݌෤. Country 1 will produce ݍ෤ଵ ൐ ݍଵ∗ and country 2 will produce ݍ෤ଶ ൏ ݍଶ∗. The tax-
induced reallocation of public good production is equal to the distance CB and ݍ෤ଵ ൅ ݍ෤ଶ is 
equal to ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ. Overall costs will increase if country 1 introduces 1t  relative to pure cap-
and-trade. Excess costs are represented by the area BAD. The overall quantity target ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ 
is equal to the width of the x axis and equal to ݍଵ∗ ൅ ݍଶ∗ or ݍ෤ଵ ൅ ݍ෤ଶ respectively. The example 
shown in this figure is an interior solution. The marginal cost function of country 1 is shifted 
downward since functions are plotted in the space of cap-and-trade prices and quantities and 
country 1 would produce some of the good even if the cap-and-trade price (y axis) was zero. 
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Model parameterization 
To gain empirical insights into the issue under uncertainty, cost functions are parameterized. 
We use the same parameterization for cost functions as in Wood et al. (2013). Abatement cost 
functions for countries 1 and 2 are given by 
ܿ௜ሺݍ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ଵଶ ߠ௜ ∝௜ ݍ௜ଶ, 
where ∝௜ determines the slope of the marginal cost curves and is constant, ߠ௜ is a random 
variable, and ݍ௜ is the amount of the produced abatement. 
It is assumed that the random variable ߠ௜ is log-normally distributed and has a mean 
value of 1. Marginal costs are given by 
ܿ௜ᇱሺݍ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ߠ௜ ∝௜ ݍ௜. 
Assuming linear marginal costs keeps the analysis more tractable and has been 
standard procedure in the relevant literature (e.g. Hagem and Westkog 1998). Relative to 
abatement cost curves derived from empirical studies, linear marginal abatement costs will 
likely underestimate the increase in abatement costs as marginal costs increase, however this 
has no bearing on our qualitative results.5 
In the interior solution, the number of allowances sold from country 1 to country 2, ܽ, 
will be the choice for which 
ܿଵᇱሺܳଵ ൅ ܽ, ߠଵሻ ൅ ݐ ൌ ܿଶᇱ ሺܳଶ െ ܽ, ߠଶሻ; 
and for the corner solution, ܽ ൌ ܳଶ. The minimum tax rate for which there is a corner solution 
is the tax rate for which the number of allowances (in the interior solution) is equal to ܳଶ. It 
                                                          
5 Marginal abatement cost curves can be non-differentiable as shown by McKitrick (1999) and can have high 
inter- and intra-sectoral variance, as shown for the case of different air pollutants by Hartman et al. (1997), in 
which case simplifying assumptions are needed. 
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follows that with the parameterization above, the number of allowances is given by the 
following equation. 
ܽ ൌ ቐ
െߙଵߠଵܳଵ ൅ ߙଶߠଶܳଶ ൅ ݐ
ߙଵߠଵ ൅ ߙଶߠଶ 	,			ݐ ൏ ߙଵߠଵሺܳଵ ൅ ܳଶሻ
					ܳଶ																								݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁.
 
The allowance price is equal to the marginal cost for country 2 to produce the amount 
ܳଶ െ ܽ of abatement, and is given by the following equation. 
݌ ൌ ቐെ
ߙଶߠଶሺߙଵߠଵܳଵ െ ߙଵߠଵܳଶ ൅ ݐሻ
ߙଵߠଵ ൅ ߙଶߠଶ 		,					ݐ ൏ ሺܳଵ ൅ ܳଶሻߙଵߠଵ
									0																																			݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
The total costs for each country are then calculated by substituting ܽ and ݌ into the 
equations 
ܥଵ ൌ ܿଵሺܳଵ ൅ ܽ, ߠଵሻ െ ܽ݌ 
and 
ܥଶ ൌ ܿଶሺܳଶ ൅ ܽ, ߠଶሻ െ ܽ݌. 
Uncertainty is modeled so that abatement costs of both countries are either fully 
independent or fully correlated. In reality, deviations from expectations about abatement costs 
in two countries would usually be partially correlated, so our modeling of uncertainty can be 
seen as boundary cases. Negative correlation is generally not to be expected, because 
“surprises” in abatement costs are likely to be positively correlated between different 
countries or regions. 
To see this, consider typical reasons why actual abatement costs may deviate from ex-
ante expectations. This may arise because technologies are less or more available or more or 
less costly than expected; because prices for energy and other production inputs differ from 
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expectations; or because the behavior of businesses and individuals in response to emissions 
prices differs from that expected. In all of these cases, there is reason to expect that the 
surprise would occur and point in the same direction in all jurisdictions (or in both countries 
in our analysis), though the strength of its effect may be very different. Uncertainties that stem 
from policy making — for example, changes in policies that have interaction with emissions 
pricing — can be considered as largely independent between countries; again there is no 
reason to suspect that they would be negatively correlated. 
In the default scenarios we assume the uncertainty parameters ߠ௜ are log-normally 
distributed with a scale parameter of ߪ ൌ 0.4, and we also test other parameter values. The 
effect of these scale parameters on the probability distributions for ߠ௜ are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of log-normal distributions for different scale parameters ߪ to describe the 
probability distributions for the random variables ߠ௜ as applied in the model. 
 
3 Application of the model 
In this section, different sets of parameters are applied to the model by numerically evaluating 
expected costs for both countries under uncertainty using the software package Wolfram 
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Mathematica 8. In a first step, costs are evaluated assuming ex-ante identical countries, i.e., 
countries of same size and having the same parameters for uncertainty. The model application 
will focus on the effect of an additional tax introduced in country 1 on top of an existing cap-
and-trade scheme on expected costs for both countries, and the distribution of abatement 
effort between the two countries. To do so, different levels of ݐଵ. and overall ambition in 
producing the public good are considered. 
In a second step, the model application is expanded from the case of identical 
countries to a case where parameters are chosen so that they mimic the situation in the 
EU ETS. While these countries are covered by a joint cap-and-trade scheme, the ambitions of 
climate and energy policies differ strongly between countries. Many EU member states 
introduced policies that aim to set incentives for greenhouse-gas reduction in addition to the 
EU ETS. Examples, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper, include the UK carbon 
floor price, existing carbon taxes in several EU states, and the German renewable feed-in 
tariff scheme. 
The objective of the approach taken here is not to generate empirically reliable figures 
on the effect of climate policy actions taken by EU member states, but to illustrate the partial 
effects of those policies on abatement and expected costs, in the situation where countries and 
sectors which are subject to the additional tax are not identical as in the simplified standard 
assumption. We do not claim to generate results which actually reflect the situation in the 
EU ETS because of the static partial equilibrium structure of the model, and choice of simple 
quadratic abatement cost functions (linear marginal abatement costs). 
Ex-ante identical countries 
Suppose that both countries are ex-ante identical, i.e., are of same size, have the same 
abatement costs ሺߙଵ ൌ ߙଶ ൌ 1ሻ, and take on the same targets ሺܳଵ ൌ ܳଶ ൌ 1ሻ. We compare 
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expected costs under pure cap-and-trade without the additional tax ሺݐଵ ൌ 0ሻ to the situation 
when country 1 levies an additional charge on top of the allowance price ሺݐଵ ൐ 0ሻ 
Figure 3 plots expected costs and amounts of emissions reductions as a function of the 
tax rate under three different assumptions about uncertainty: (1) that there is no uncertainty in 
the cost function; (2) uncertainty in cost is perfectly correlated for both countries; and (3) 
uncertainties in cost are independent. 
As derived theoretically above, abatement costs increase for country 1 and decrease 
for country 2 as ݐଵ is increased. Under certainty, a corner solution will be reached at ݐଵ ൌ 2. 
In this case, costs of country 2 become zero. Under certainty and ݐଵ ൌ 0 (the reference case of 
pure cap-and-trade), the permit price would be 1. The tax rates in the figures below should be 
interpreted relative to this price. Abatement costs are lower when costs are correlated because 
individual realizations will include situations where different costs lead to gains from 
allowance trading. 
Figure 3a also plots the expected amount of the public good that will be produced 
(solid/dashed black line). The overall quantity targets under cap-and-trade are set to equal 
ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ ൌ 2 in this application. The amount of expected abatement (dashed black line) 
slowly increases as ݐଵ increases, because of the increasing probability of a corner solution 
with greater production of the public good than targeted. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3: Expected costs for Country 1 (3a) and Country 2 (3b) as a function of the additional 
charge ݐଵ levied by Country 1, with fully correlated and independent abatement costs, and 
assuming a scale parameter for uncertainty given by ߪ ൌ 0.4. Panel (3a) also shows expected 
abatement as a function of ݐଵ. 
 
Figure 4 shows independent and correlated expected total unit cost (or average cost) of 
abatement (sum of expected cost of both countries divided by expected abatement), as well as 
the expected allowance price and the expected number of traded allowances under correlated 
uncertainty. Unit cost and the number of traded allowances increase in ݐଵ. The expected 
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allowance price decreases as ݐଵ is increased. The elasticity of the allowance price under cap-
and-trade with respect to the tax rate depends on relative abatement costs in both countries 
and the nature and extent of uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 4: Expected independent and correlated total unit cost of abatement (average cost; 
sum of expected cost of both countries divided by expected abatement), expected correlated 
allowance price, and expected correlated allowances traded for ex-ante similar countries, 
assuming a scale parameter for uncertainty given by ߪ ൌ 0.4.   
 
The results are of particular interest with respect to the EU ETS. Countries that 
participate in the EU ETS are largely independent with respect to designing additional 
domestic climate policies and fiscal policy in general. In many EU countries additional 
policies for abatement beyond the EU ETS where introduced. However, countries are not ex-
ante identical, but differ in terms of the size of regulated industries and abatement costs (for 
example through differences in technology). We will examine the case of the EU ETS in a 
stylized application to the EU’s emissions trading scheme in the following section. 
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Stylized Application to the EU ETS 
Under the burden-sharing agreement (EU, 2002), each EU country has been assigned some 
amount of allowable emissions (an emissions target), which implicitly leads to abatement 
obligations (ܳ௜ in the model above). The developments in the EU in the first and second 
trading period of the EU ETS (2007 to 2012) have revealed that there is significant 
uncertainty about demand for allowances by regulated companies and uncertainty about actual 
abatement costs (Hintermann, 2010). Emissions regulated by the EU ETS dropped 
significantly since 2008, leading to a considerable surplus and dramatically lower allowance 
prices. 
A number of EU countries have introduced or reinforced additional climate policies 
parallel to the EU ETS. An example is the UK carbon “price floor,” which works as an 
additional levy on each tonne of CO2 emitted by combustion installations regulated by the 
EU ETS.6 The policy matches directly to our model, with the UK being the “tax country.” 
The UK combustion sector represents approximately 10 percent of total emissions 
covered under the EU ETS, so country 1 will be much smaller than country 2. On average, 
changes in emissions in the sector are positively correlated to the rest of the EU ETS, with a 
positive correlation of about 0.5. 
Another example is the German renewable feed-in tariff scheme. While the policy 
offers subsidies for renewable energy instead of taxing greenhouse-gas emissions it still has 
an effect on the EU ETS by achieving some amount of emissions reductions in addition to 
that achieved by the EU ETS, and by thereby decreasing the allowance price within the ETS. 
Since our model is a partial equilibrium model and uses only stylized assumptions 
about abatement costs and uncertainty, the results should not be interpreted as an actual 
                                                          
6 A “price floor” normally describes a minimum price within an ETS, implemented for example through a 
reserve price at auction (Wood and Jotzo, 2011). The UK scheme arrangement is related but different to this 
standard version of a price floor. 
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evaluation of the effects of the UK price floor arrangement.7 Our purpose is to give a broad 
indication about the magnitude of its effects, given in particular the relative magnitude of 
emissions covered by the “tax” and not covered. 
To examine the effect of a “small country” (as part of the overall ETS) introducing an 
extra tax, we assume that the non-tax country 2 is ten times larger than country 1. We use a 
country size parameter ܵ ൌ 10, so that ܳଵ ൌ 1 and ܳଶ ൌ ܵܳଵ ൌ 10, and adjust country 2’s 
abatement cost parameter by ߙଶ ܵ⁄ . We assume moderate uncertainty about abatement costs, 
with a scale parameter of ߪ ൌ 0.2, and that abatement costs are perfectly correlated. 
Abatement costs in country 2 are slightly higher than in country 1 ሺߙଵ ൌ 1, ߙଶ ൌ 1.1 ܵ⁄ ሻ. 
Table 1 and Figure 5 show the allowance price under cap-and-trade; the number of 
traded allowances; abatement; and expected costs. If the tax were zero (pure cap-and-trade) 
the expected allowance price per unit of abatement would be 1.09. A small amount of 
allowances is sold from country 1 to country 2. Country 1’s total costs are about 9 percent of 
country 2’s costs. This is a least-cost situation where country 2 is large relative to country 1 
and has higher abatement costs. 
As country 1 introduces a tax, the price of allowances decreases. At tax rate ݐ ൌ 0.55 
(about 50 percent of the allowance price) the expected price is about 5 percent less than it is 
when ݐଵ ൌ 0. If country 1 sets the tax rate approximately equal to the cap-and-trade price, 
allowance prices decrease by about 9 percent relative to ݐଵ ൌ 0. Since country 1 is 
considerably smaller than country 2, the effect of the tax on the allowance price is relatively 
small. The amount of allowances sold from country 1 to country 2 increases as t is increased. 
This is because a greater share of the overall abatement is produced in country 1 on account of 
the tax. 
                                                          
7 We assume quadratic abatement cost functions for both countries and a log-linear probability distribution to 
calculate expected values by numerical integration using the software package Wolfram Mathematica. For a 
detailed description of the parameterized model and the structure of uncertainty please see Wood et al. (2013, pp. 
4-7) 
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Since more abatement occurs in country 1 for ݐଵ ൌ 0, the total abatement costs of 
country 1 increase as ݐ1 increases. While the feedback of the tax on the allowance price is 
moderate if country 1 is small, cost increases in country 1 are considerable. For a tax of about 
50 percent of the allowance price, costs for country 1 increase by about 37 percent relative to 
ݐଵ ൌ 0. If the tax is set to approximately equal to the allowance price ሺݐଵ ൌ 1ሻ country 1’s 
domestic abatement costs will be more than twice as much as they are when ݐଵ ൌ 0. Cost 
increases in country 1 are accompanied by small cost decreases in country 2. This is because 
country 2 can purchase allowances from country 1 and allowance prices decrease as ݐଵ is 
increased. Combined costs increase relative to the situation without a tax because country 1’s 
cost increases cannot be offset by cost decreases in country 2. 
 
Figure 5: Expected values for ETS allowance price, number of traded allowances, cost for 
Country 1 and Country 2, and total cost for tax rates 0, 0.5, and 1 in Country 1 (see Table 1 
for details). 
 
The model application showed that the introduction of an additional tax under cap-
and-trade and uncertain abatement costs will have a moderate effect on prices and total 
abatement costs if the country or sector covered by the tax is small relative to the remaining 
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countries or sectors, and if the tax rate is small relative to the allowance price. For example, a 
tax rate of 10 percent of the allowance price in the model application leads to a decrease in 
the allowance price of about 1 percent and an increase in total costs of about 0.1 percent. If 
country 1 is small, it further is unlikely that a corner solution will be reached (all of the 
combined abatement task fulfilled by the tax in country 1 alone). 
Allowance price elasticity, country size, and uncertainty 
In this subsection we examine the elasticity of the cap-and-trade price with respect to the tax 
rate, and its relationship to country size and uncertainty. Under the parameterization of this 
paper, elasticities are not constant. This approach helps provide an understanding of how 
prices are affected by country size and correlations in uncertainty parameters. The elasticity of 
the cap-and-trade price with respect to the tax thus gives an indication of efficiency 
implications of the additional tax. In our simple model (omitting effects of innovation and 
other long-run effects), the additional tax always leads to additional costs for the country that 
levies the tax in addition to the cap-and-trade scheme. The actual extent of additional costs, 
however, depends on the feedback of the unilateral tax on the joint cap-and-trade scheme, i.e., 
the elasticity of the allowance price with respect to the tax. 
We calculate expected prices by numerical integration for tuples of ܵ ൌ 1, 2, . . . , 10 
and  ൌ 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.5.8 For each S, tuple, prices are evaluated for ݐ ൌ 0.1, 0.11, . . . , 1 so 
that price-tax combinations are obtained for each of the ܵ, tuples. To estimate the average 
elasticity of cap-and-trade prices with respect to the tax we consider a simple linear elasticity 
model of the form 
logሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௜ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ logሺݐܽݔ௜ሻ ൅ ݑ௜. 
                                                          
8 For detailed information on how uncertainty is modeled, see pp. 5–7 of Wood et al. (2013) 
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The linear elasticity model is estimated for ܵ, tuples to obtain elasticity ߚଵ,ௌ,ఙ. If the 
tax in country 1 increases by 1 percent, the price in the joint cap-and-trade scheme changes by 
ߚଵ,ௌ,ఙ percent. 
Tables 2 and 3 show elasticity ߚଵ,ௌ,ఙ for independent and correlated uncertainty. The 
elasticity of the price under cap-and-trade with respect to the tax is dependent on relative 
country size ܵ and on the uncertainty scale parameter . For independent abatement costs, a 
larger uncertainty scale parameter leads to higher sensitivity of the cap-and-trade price with 
respect to changes in the tax rate. If country 1 is small, the effect of changes in the tax rate 
tend to be relatively low. For ܵ ൌ 10 and 	 ൌ 0.2, a 1 percent increase in the tax rate would 
lead to an average decrease of 0.048 percent in the cap-and-trade price. 
For perfectly correlated abatement costs, the elasticity of the price with respect to the 
tax is in general lower than when abatement costs are independent, while the effect of 
uncertainty is reversed. The elasticity is slightly lower for higher values of the scale parameter 
. In particular for the case of country 1 being relatively large both countries can encounter 
high cost if there is perfectly correlated uncertainty. Therefore the effect of the tax on the 
price can be less pronounced for larger values of , i.e., since the tax rate was assumed not to 
exceed ݐ ൌ 1 in this application. With respect to country size, the previous results also hold in 
the case of correlated uncertainty, where the elasticity of the price with respect to the tax is 
rather low if ܵ is large and country 1 is small relative to country 2. 
For a case like the UK power sector, it might be reasonable to assume ܵ ൌ 10 with 
uncertainty and some positive correlation (not necessarily perfect correlation). As Tables 2 
and 3 show, there is not much difference between the cases of perfectly correlated and 
uncorrelated abatement costs. The model results indicate that the elasticity of the cap-and-
trade price with respect to the tax (for ݐ ൌ 0.1, 0.11, . . . , 1) will be between െ0.040 
and െ0.058 if a “small country” introduces a tax. 
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4 Discussion and policy implications 
Our stochastic partial equilibrium model demonstrates that unilateral additional efforts for 
public good production (i.e., an additional unilateral tax) under a joint cap-and-trade scheme 
will cause excess costs and will in most cases not yield additional production of the public 
good. Two cases can be distinguished. 
In the interior solution the cap-and-trade price will be greater than zero in the presence 
of the tax. In this situation more abatement efforts are borne by country 1. Costs for country 1 
increase accordingly, while costs for country 2 decrease. Total costs (the sum of cost of both 
countries) will increase since increased costs of country 1 cannot be offset by cost savings in 
country 2. There is no additional production of the public good (abatement) in the interior 
solution since the joint quantity target ܳ1 ൅ ܳ2 is binding. 
In the corner solution, all abatement is borne by country 1 and there is no need for 
further abatement by country 2. The allowance price is zero in the corner solution. 
Expected costs for country 1 and expected total costs will in most cases be 
considerably higher than with pure cap-and-trade without the additional tax. The allowance 
price decreases, and extra costs increase, as the tax rate is increased. 
The stochastic modeling showed that country size and the magnitude of uncertainty 
about abatement costs are important determinants of the effect of the tax on the allowance 
price. In section 3 we examined the case of a small country with additional tax. The 
application showed that the introduction of the tax will lead to increased expected allowance 
sales from country 1 to country 2 (see table 1), so that public good production (and cost) is re-
allocated from country 2 to country 1. Expected costs for country 1 increase considerably, 
while the cost of country 2 decrease slightly, and combined costs increase due to the 
divergence in marginal costs. 
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The elasticity of the allowance price with respect to the tax for different country size 
and levels of uncertainty was examined in section 3. For the chosen parameter set, the effect 
of country size on the elasticity is more pronounced than for the level of uncertainty. 
Expected allowance prices decrease as the tax is increased. If country 1 is small, the effect of 
the tax on the allowance price is moderate. 
One reason for country 1 to introduce an additional tax could be that the country aims 
to speed up the decarburization of the economy and to set stronger incentives for innovation 
(relative to country 2). Such aspects are omitted in our model, but may be of importance in 
theory and practice, if stronger action is viewed as improving dynamic efficiency or desired 
for other reasons. Carbon pricing can offer strong incentives for innovation, and again 
“country size” is an important determinant of the prospects for reaping dynamic efficiency 
gains (Downing and White, 1986; Milliman and Prince, 1989). The “stringency” of regulation 
can be important for the extent of innovation, as shown for the EU ETS and the power sector 
by Rogge et al. (2011). Innovation research in the field of environmental economics has 
further emphasized the dual aspect of environmental regulation on externalities. While 
negative externalities, such as pollution, are decreased, the incentives for innovation can be 
interpreted as a positive externality caused by a price (Rennings, 2000). 
Our model does not account for the effects of innovation. However, for additional 
policies in one country to be globally welfare enhancing, the positive innovation externality 
must at least outweigh excess costs of the policy. Innovation activity can be expected to 
increase in the country that introduces the additional policy, but could decrease in the other 
country on account of the lower allowance price.9 This could lead to overall greater 
innovation activity, for example if the greater incentives in the country with the additional 
policy allow the crossing of an “innovation threshold” that would not be reached under a pure 
                                                          
9 This argument is related to dynamic efficiency of regulation discussed in Downing and White (1986). 
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cap-and-trade scheme. Whether and under which conditions this may hold is an empirical 
question beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 Conclusion 
We have examined the introduction of additional national policies for public good production, 
specifically a national carbon tax in one country, under a joint cap-and-trade scheme of two 
countries with fixed joint quantity targets. Examples for such additional policies would be the 
UK carbon price floor or the German renewable feed-in tariff scheme in combination with 
environmental regulation by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Both unilateral policies aim 
at the utility sector, which already is regulated by the EU ETS. 
In most cases the additional tax will not lead to additional abatement beyond the fixed 
quantity target. Additional abatement will only occur in the case when a corner solution is 
reached. In this case all abatement is undertaken by the country with the extra tax, the 
allowance price under cap-and-trade will be zero, and expected costs are considerably higher. 
Countries may pursue dynamic efficiency objectives in strengthening their domestic 
effort, including through fostering the innovation effort. We do not evaluate this aspect, rather 
we investigate the effect of relative country size and magnitude of abatement cost uncertainty. 
The expected allowance price decrease as the tax rate is increased. The effect depends 
on the relative size of the country that introduces the additional policy and the extent of 
uncertainty. The smaller the country with additional policy is, the smaller will be the feedback 
of the tax on the allowance price. Larger uncertainty will lead to a stronger feedback effect if 
abatement costs are independent and will lead to smaller feedback effect if costs are perfectly 
correlated. 
Our model results highlight the importance of interactions between domestic climate 
policies and overarching mechanisms such the EU ETS. Countries may have specific national 
objectives in introducing additional policy mechanisms domestically. However such 
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additional national policies will generally not result in overall increased effort, and will result 
in higher overall static abatement cost. It is possible that there are gains in dynamic efficiency, 
for example through enhanced innovation effort in the country with the additional policies. 
Whether and under which conditions these exist and outweigh the additional static costs that 
arise from diverging marginal costs of abatement remains an open question. 
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Table 1: Numerical evaluation of an additional tax under a joint cap-and-trade if Country 2 is 10 times larger than Country 1 (S=10), if there is 
intermediate uncertainty about abatement costs (Sigma=0.2), and Country 2’s abatement cost parameter is slightly higher than Country 1’s (ߙଵ ൌ1, ߙଶ ൌ 1.1). Abatement costs are assumed to be perfectly correlated. All values (other than the tax rate) are expectations.  
Tax Price 
Price 
Change % 
Tax/Price 
Ratio 
Allowances 
Traded 
Allowances 
Change % Abatement Cost 1 
Cost 1 
Change % Cost 2 
Cost 2 
Change % Total cost 
Total Cost 
Change % 
0.00 1.090 - - 0.090 - 11 0.496 - 5.500 - 5.995 - 
0.05 1.085 -0.45 0.046 0.144 60 11 0.498 0.39 5.499 -0.01 5.996 0.02 
0.10 1.080 -0.91 0.093 0.198 120 11 0.503 1.38 5.498 -0.03 6.000 0.09 
0.15 1.075 -1.36 0.140 0.252 180 11 0.511 2.97 5.497 -0.05 6.007 0.20 
0.20 1.070 -1.82 0.187 0.306 240 11 0.521 5.15 5.496 -0.07 6.016 0.35 
0.25 1.065 -2.27 0.235 0.360 300 11 0.535 7.94 5.494 -0.10 6.028 0.55 
0.30 1.060 -2.73 0.283 0.414 360 11 0.552 11.32 5.492 -0.14 6.043 0.80 
0.35 1.055 -3.18 0.332 0.468 420 11 0.572 15.30 5.490 -0.18 6.060 1.09 
0.40 1.050 -3.64 0.381 0.523 480 11 0.595 19.89 5.487 -0.22 6.080 1.42 
0.45 1.045 -4.09 0.430 0.577 540 11 0.620 25.07 5.485 -0.27 6.103 1.80 
0.50 1.041 -4.55 0.481 0.631 600 11 0.649 30.85 5.482 -0.32 6.128 2.22 
0.55 1.036 -5.00 0.531 0.685 660 11 0.681 37.23 5.478 -0.38 6.156 2.68 
0.60 1.031 -5.45 0.582 0.739 720 11 0.715 44.21 5.475 -0.45 6.186 3.19 
0.65 1.026 -5.91 0.634 0.793 780 11 0.753 51.78 5.471 -0.52 6.219 3.75 
0.70 1.021 -6.36 0.686 0.847 840 11 0.793 59.96 5.467 -0.59 6.255 4.35 
0.75 1.016 -6.82 0.738 0.901 900 11 0.837 68.73 5.463 -0.67 6.294 4.99 
0.80 1.011 -7.27 0.791 0.955 960 11 0.883 78.11 5.458 -0.75 6.335 5.68 
0.85 1.006 -7.73 0.845 1.009 1020 11 0.933 88.08 5.453 -0.84 6.379 6.41 
0.90 1.001 -8.18 0.899 1.063 1080 11 0.985 98.65 5.448 -0.94 6.425 7.18 
0.95 0.996 -8.64 0.954 1.117 1140 11 1.041 109.82 5.443 -1.03 6.475 8.00 
1.00 0.991 -9.09 1.009 1.171 1200 11 1.099 121.59 5.437 -1.14 6.526 8.87 
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Table 2: Elasticity of the allowance price for changes in the tax rate for different country size (S) and uncertainty scale parameter (ߪ). Cost 
uncertainty is independent. 
S ߪ 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 
1 -0.30082 -0.31017 -0.31804 -0.32439 -0.32945 -0.33349 -0.33674 -0.33936 -0.34149 -0.34323 
2 -0.17815 -0.18478 -0.19114 -0.19716 -0.20276 -0.20791 -0.21263 -0.21693 -0.22085 -0.22442 
3 -0.12684 -0.13185 -0.13668 -0.14136 -0.14586 -0.15015 -0.15423 -0.15809 -0.16173 -0.16516 
4 -0.09854 -0.10256 -0.10646 -0.11025 -0.11392 -0.11747 -0.12089 -0.12418 -0.12734 -0.13036 
5 -0.08058 -0.08395 -0.08722 -0.0904 -0.09349 -0.0965 -0.09942 -0.10225 -0.10499 -0.10763 
6 -0.06816 -0.07106 -0.07389 -0.07663 -0.07931 -0.08191 -0.08445 -0.08692 -0.08933 -0.09166 
7 -0.05907 -0.06161 -0.0641 -0.06652 -0.06887 -0.07118 -0.07342 -0.07562 -0.07775 -0.07984 
8 -0.05211 -0.05438 -0.0566 -0.05876 -0.06088 -0.06294 -0.06496 -0.06693 -0.06885 -0.07073 
9 -0.04663 -0.04867 -0.05068 -0.05263 -0.05455 -0.05642 -0.05825 -0.06004 -0.06179 -0.0635 
10 -0.04219 -0.04405 -0.04588 -0.04767 -0.04941 -0.05113 -0.0528 -0.05444 -0.05605 -0.05762 
 
 
 
Table 3: Elasticity of the allowance price for changes in the tax rate for different country size (S) and uncertainty scale parameter (ߪ). Cost 
uncertainty is perfectly correlated. 
S ߪ 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 
1 -0.29073 -0.29041 -0.28934 -0.28757 -0.28531 -0.28274 -0.27999 -0.27717 -0.27433 -0.27154 
2 -0.17129 -0.17128 -0.17126 -0.17116 -0.17096 -0.17065 -0.17024 -0.16974 -0.16918 -0.16857 
3 -0.12166 -0.12166 -0.12166 -0.12165 -0.12163 -0.12158 -0.12150 -0.12139 -0.12126 -0.12110 
4 -0.09438 -0.09438 -0.09438 -0.09438 -0.09437 -0.09437 -0.09435 -0.09432 -0.09429 -0.09425 
5 -0.07711 -0.07711 -0.07711 -0.07711 -0.07710 -0.07710 -0.07710 -0.07710 -0.07709 -0.07708 
6 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06518 -0.06519 -0.06519 
7 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05646 -0.05647 
8 -0.04979 -0.04979 -0.04979 -0.04979 -0.04979 -0.04979 -0.04979 -0.04980 -0.04980 -0.04981 
9 -0.04453 -0.04453 -0.04453 -0.04453 -0.04453 -0.04453 -0.04454 -0.04454 -0.04454 -0.04455 
10 -0.04028 -0.04028 -0.04028 -0.04028 -0.04028 -0.04028 -0.04028 -0.04029 -0.04029 -0.04030 
 
